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Abstract 
In this paper, we construct a macroeconomic growth model where social capital embedded in 
collaborative networks of firms (such as corporate partnerships and research consortia) 
increase the rate of technological and business innovations in high-tech industries. Social 
capital is created via network-building activities and through “learning-by-doing”. We derive 
the optimal quantity of resources that should be channelled away from pure production into 
activities that build network social capital, and study both the comparative statics and 
transitional dynamics of the model. We also examine the implications of the model for 
policymakers interested in formulating innovation policies. 
 
JEL codes: O31, O41, Z13 





In developed countries, the "New Economy" of the 1990s and the new millennia has witnessed 
a distinct gravitation towards inter-organizational linkages in the form of partnerships and 
consortia. Many firms and industries have formed productive collaborative relationships with 
other firms, laboratories and universities, as well as local and national governments to leverage 
the benefits of cooperation. These relationships involve shared resources, group problem-
solving, multiple sources of learning, collaborative development, and diffusion of innovation. 
The reason for this trend is that the investments required to sustain technology development 
and deployment have increased to such an extent that single firms are often unable to 
undertake the level of risk necessary for innovation. 
      Fountain  (1998)  argues  that  gains  in economic performance and innovative capacity 
depend on the institutional effectiveness of these relationships as measured by the available 
stock of social capital. Social capital is created when a group of organizations develops the 
ability to work together for mutually productive gain. The relationships between the 
organizations may be horizontal among similar firms in associations, vertical in supply chains, 
and multidirectional in their linkages to sources of technical knowledge, human resources, and 
public agencies. Cooperation paradoxically enhances competitiveness, information sharing 
leads to joint gains, while the importance of reputation and trust ensure reciprocity and fair 
play within a given network. Social capital is located both in the sharable resources held by 
individual institutions in a network as well as in the overall structure of the network. Social 
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capital is preserved by careful selection of network players and strict sanctioning of 
inappropriate network-destroying behavior. 
    Fountain gives two examples of high-performance network structures that have developed 
significant levels of intra-network trust. The first describes the ways in which firms in the 
biotechnology industry partner to remain at the forefront of research and development. The 
second examines the dynamics that undergird regional industrial systems, as exemplified by 
the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley. 
      In this paper, we extend the Romer (1990) / Jones (1995) growth model with endogenous 
technological progress to incorporate network social capital.
2 Network social capital increases 
the gains from collaboration between firms engaged in technological innovation and raises the 
productivity of each R&D worker. This in turn increases the rate at which new intermediate 
goods are introduced and the efficiency of final goods production. We derive the optimal 
quantity of resources that should be channelled into social capital-building activities and 
examine how this quantity and the steady state growth rate of the economy depend on the spill-
overs of the social capital “stock” on the creation of new social capital and the productivity of 
R&D. The effects of other parameters characterizing technologies and preferences in the 
different sectors of the model economy on the steady state solution are also considered. We 
quantify the under-creation of social capital arising from its public goods aspect and 
investigate the dynamic response of the model to various shocks. Lastly, we discuss the 
implications of the model for the design of innovation policies. 
      This paper is organized as follows. In this section, we discussed the importance of network 
social capital for collaborative R&D activities among high-technology firms. In Section 2, we 
explain how social capital may arise from “learning-by-doing” as much as it is created by 
deliberately channelling resources into network-building activities. The important 
characteristics of social capital that we wish to capture in our model are also identified in this 
section. Section 3 introduces the key equations in the model, while Section 4 presents the 
microeconomic foundations of the model. Results (steady-state solutions, comparative statics 
and transitional dynamics) as well as implications of the model are discussed in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Social Capital and Innovations 
 
2.1 Social Capital and “Learning-by-Doing” 
 
According to Maskell (2000), social capital also facilitates the `low-tech' learning and 
innovation that takes place when firms in traditional industries are innovative in how they 
handle and develop resource management, logistics, production, organization, marketing, sales, 
distribution, industrial relations, and other tasks and activities. He argues that much of this is 
due to inter-firm learning. Pure market interactions by themselves are often incapable of 
facilitating this due to the problem of asymmetric information. For example, potential buyers 
of information want to ascertain the merit of knowledge offered for sale. But when fully 
informed of the content of the knowledge offered, it has in effect acquired it for free.
3 
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      Maskell argues that these market failures in the exchange of knowledge between firms can 
only be overcome when open market relations are superseded by stable and reciprocal 
exchange arrangements based on trust. Trust will characterize a relation between firms when 
each is confident that the other's present value of all foreseeable future exchanges exceeds the 
possible benefits of breaking the relation. The key argument is that the time and resources 
needed to build a relationship varies with the stock of social capital that the firms in question 
might attain through membership in a community. However, according to Maskell, "(w)e still 
know very little about the actual process by which social capital is produced and accumulated, 
beyond suspecting that it might be a mainly unanticipated consequences of doing something 
else - just like, for instance, learning by doing." (p.114) 
 
2.2 Characteristics of Social Capital to be Modelled 
 
As social capital is such a multifaceted concept, it is important to focus on those aspects of it 
that matter for macroeconomic performance through their effects on business and 
technological innovations. We list the important attributes of social capital that we wish to 
capture in our model, and present a simple typology of the levels and forms of social capital. 
 
2.2.1 Key Attributes of Social Capital 
 
Social capital is capital because it is an accumulated stock from which a stream of benefits 
flows. It is therefore more than simply a set of social organizations or social values.  Like 
human capital, social capital may accumulate as a result of its use; it is therefore both an input 
and output of collective action. However, although every other form of capital has a potential 
productive impact in a Robinson Crusoe economy, social capital does not – creating and 
activating social capital requires at least two people. Social capital therefore has public good 
characteristics, so underproduction is likely because of incomplete internalization of the 
positive externalities inherent in its production. 
      On the other hand, like other forms of capital, social capital is not costless to produce and 
requires a significant amount of time and effort. Moreover, since trust is more easily destroyed 
than rebuilt, there is a maintenance expense to social capital, often in the form of time. 
 
2.2.2 The Scope and Forms of Social Capital 
 
Social capital may exist on multiple levels. At the micro level, social capital encapsulates 
features of social organizations, such as networks of individuals or households. At the meso 
level, social capital includes vertical as well as horizontal associations and behaviour within 
and among other entities, such as firms. At the macro level, social capital includes the most 
formalized institutional relationships and structures, such as the political regime, the rule of 
law, the court system, and civil and political liberties. In this paper, we are primarily interested 
in studying meso-level “linking” social capital. 
      At each level of social capital, social capital affects economic performance as a result of 
the interactions between two distinct types of social capital. As noted by Grootaert and van 
Bastalaer (2002), structural social capital (or institutional capital) facilitates information 
sharing and collective action and decision-making through established roles and social 
networks supplemented by rules, procedures and precedents. Cognitive social capital (or 
relational capital), on the other hand, refers to shared norms, values, trust, attitudes and beliefs, 
and is a more subjective and intangible concept. 
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3. The Key Equations 
 
In this paper, we are interested in modelling the impact of network social capital on the 
innovative activities of high-technology firms and the relationship between these activities and 
macroeconomic growth, as discussed in Section 2.1. However, we will also draw on insights 
by Maskell (2000) on how social capital may be created (in his case, by firms in traditional 
industries) through “learning-by-doing” (see Section 2.2). 
 
3.1 The Creation of Network Social Capital 
 
    In our model, there are many identical infinitely-lived agents. Each agent may devote time 
to final goods production (which enables current consumption), or to R&D activities. R&D 
activities include the design of new technical blueprints and the building of network social 
capital. The last activity produces no revenues for the R&D firms by itself but increases the 
effectiveness of collaborative R&D and hence the rate of technological progress in the 
economy. 
    In modelling the evolution of network social capital, we wish to incorporate the following 
elements: (1) the building or accumulation of social capital requires resources to be diverted 
from other productive uses; (2) social capital decays over time without new "investment" in 
social capital; (3) the existing stock of social capital has spillover effects on the building of 
new social capital; and (4) social capital has a positive impact of the rate of technological 
progress through R&D but no direct effect on final goods production. The dynamic equation 
for social capital from a social planner’s perspective, denoted S  , is of the form: 
     () ˆ σ φλδ =− 
SS SP u LS K S       ( 1 )  
where uS in the share of the economy’s labor L devoted to social capital creation,  ˆ K  is the 
aggregate physical capital stock, δS is the rate at which social capital decays, P is a productivity 
constant, while σ, φ , and λ  are positive elasticity parameters. φ  measures the spillover effect 
of existing social capital on the creation of new social capital, while λ  measures the strength 
of the Maskell (2000) “learning-by-doing effect”. The more the economy has worked with 
physical capital, the more social capital it generates as a by-product. 
      From the perspective of an individual firm, the equation governing the creation of social 
capital is 
     () ˆ σ λ δ =−  
SS SP u LK S ,      (1’) 
where 
φ =  PP S . That is, each firm takes the network-wide stock of social capital as 
exogenously given. The positive externality that this stock confers on each firm (the public 
goods aspect of social capital) means that social capital will be under-produced in the 
decentralized, competitive model. 
 
3.2 Network Social Capital and the Evolution of Technology 
 
The rate of technological innovation is governed by the production function 
     








B BA L S
      ( 2 )  
where   B  is the productivity of each worker in the R&D sector, and  = AA Lu L  where  A u  is the 
share of labor devoted to the production of new technical designs. As argued previously, the 
amount of network social capital is a determinant of the productivity of R&D, the strength of 
the relationship being measured by the parameter β. The rest of equation (2) follows the Jones   5
(1995) specification for a R&D growth model. 
1 η−
A L  measures the “stepping on toes” effect 
whereby an increase in the number of researchers increases the likelihood of replication and 
thereby lowers the productivity of each R&D worker. 
ψ A  measures the strength of the 
“standing on the shoulders of giants” effect whereby a large existing stock of technology 
increases the rate of innovation. 
 
4. Microeconomics of the Model 
 
We describe the microeconomic foundations of the model in this section. The economy 
consists of R&D firms, final goods firms, intermediate goods producers, and households. As in 
the Romer (1990) and Jones (1995) models of R&D and growth, technological progress is 
characterized by an expanding variety of intermediate goods that are combined in the final 
goods sector to produce the consumption good. Intermediate goods producers each produce a 
unique intermediate good after having purchased the design for that good from an R&D firm. 
They then remain as monopolists in the production of that good indefinitely. Households are 
ultimate owners of all firms and decide on the optimal allocation of their labor time to the final 
goods sector and the R&D sector. Within the final goods sector, labor is allocated between 
production and activities that build network social capital.  
 
4.1 The Real R&D Sector 
 
The rate of technological innovation is governed by the production function in (2). Each R&D 
firm derives revenue  
A PA  from the sale of new designs to intermediate goods producers where 
A P  is the price of each design, and incurs labor cost  AA wuL where  A w  is the prevailing wage in 
the R&D sector. Its profits are therefore 
     π =− 
AA A A PA wuL.       ( 3 )  
The final goods firm maximizes profit subject to the constraints given in equations (1’) and (2). 
Labor is compensated according to its marginal productivity in R&D: 
      / = 
AA wP B .        ( 4 )  
 
4.2 The Final Goods Sector 
 
As in Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), the final goods sector produces the consumption good Y 
using labor uyL and a collection of intermediate inputs x, taking the available variety of 
intermediate inputs A as given: 




Y Yu L x i d i
α α − = ∫ .     (5) 
A representative producer of final goods solves the following profit maximization problem 
    () ()
1
00 ,()





uL xi d i wuL p xi xid i
α α π
− =− − ∫∫ ,   (6) 
where wy is the prevailing wage in the final goods sector and p(x(i)) is the price of intermediate 
good i. The price of the final goods is normalized to unity. The first-order conditions dictate 
that 





α =−       ( 7 ) ,  
and 
      ()
1 1 ( ( )) ( )      Y p xi uL xi i
α α α
− − = ∀ .    (8)   6
 
4.3 Intermediate Goods Producers 
 
The intermediate goods sector comprises an infinite number of firms on the interval [0,A] that 
have purchased a design from the R&D sector, who then behave as monopolists in the 
production of their specific variety of intermediate good. Each firm rents capital at rate rK and, 
using the previously purchased design, transforms each unit of capital into one unit of the 
intermediate input. (For simplicity, producer durables are transformed costlessly back into 
capital at the end of each period and no depreciation takes place.) Each intermediate goods 
firm therefore solves the following problem period-by-period: 
         () max xK
x
pxx rx π = − .     (9) 
Being monopolists, they see the downward-sloping demand curve for their producer durables 
generated in the final goods sector. This results in a standard monopoly problem with constant 
marginal cost and constant elasticity of demand, giving rising to the following solutions: 




= =∀ ,       ( 1 0 )  
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1
1 1








,    (11) 
and 




ππ α α α == − = − ∀ .    (12) 
Each intermediate firm thus sets the same price and sells the same quantity of its produced 
durable. Moreover, since 
     
0
A
Kx d i A x == ∫ ,       ( 1 3 )  
we can rewrite the aggregate final goods production function as 
      ()
1
Y YKA u L




Finally, the close the model, we examine the consumption decision of households. We assume 
that this decision may be characterized by a representative consumer maximizing an additively 
separable utility function subject to a dynamic budget constraint. We use a conventional 
CRRA utility function and assume that households are ultimate owners of all capital and 
shareholders of final goods firms, intermediate goods producers, and R&D firms. The 
optimization problem is thus: 













− ∞ − −
− ∫ ,      ( 1 5 )  
subject to 
     π =+ + + − −  
YY AA x A Kr Kw u Lw u LA P A C  
    1 YA S uuu =++, 
where C is aggregate consumption. In equilibrium, wages are equal across all sector, that is, 
YA www == . 
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5. Equilibrium, Solutions and Results 
 
5.1 Solving the Model 
 
For ease of exposition, we show the solution to the social planner’s version of the model, and 
then describe subsequently (in Section 5.5) how it differs from the decentralized, competitive 
solution. The model is solved by the standard optimal control method. The Hamiltonian for the 
social planner model is given by: 












eK u A L C K
B uL SA PuL SK S
θ
α ρα





− − − ⎡ ⎤ =+ − − ⎣ ⎦ −
⎡ ⎤ +− ⎣ ⎦
,    (16) 
where c, uY and uA are control variables; K, A and S are state variables, and υ, µ and π are the 
corresponding co-state variables. 
      The  first-order  conditions are obtained from  H/ 0 C ∂ ∂=, H/ 0 Y u ∂ ∂= , H/ 0 A u ∂∂= , 
H/ K υ ∂∂ = −  ,  H/ A µ ∂∂ = −   and  H/ S π ∂∂ = −   respectively: 
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,        ( 1 7 )  
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−= + + − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠

,      ( 2 2 )  
where  ()
1 η βψ γ
− ≡ AA B uL SA  and  ()
1 ˆ
SS S PuL S K
σ φλ γ δ
− ≡ − . 
      The transversality conditions are: 
     l i m     ( ) ( ) 0 υ
→∞ =
t tKt , 
     l i m     ( ) ( ) 0 µ
→∞ =
t tAt , 
     l i m     ( ) ( ) 0 π
→∞ =
t tSt . 
      From  ()
1 η βψ γ
− ≡ AA B uL sA , we have 
     (1 )
γ
η βγ ψ γ
γ
⎛⎞








.      ( 2 3 )  
In the steady state,  0 γ = =  AA u . Hence,  ( )/(1 ) γ ηβ γ ψ = +− AS n . 
      From  ()
1 ˆ σ φλ γ δ
− ≡− SS S PuL S K , taking logs and time derivatives yields 
    () (1 ) 0 σφ γ λ γ
⎛⎞
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Solving for γ A  and γ S  simultaneously then yields the steady-state growth rates 
    
* (1 ) ( )
(1 )(1 )
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.        ( 2 6 )  
 
5.2 Steady State Solutions 
 
The model economy is in its steady state or balanced growth path when all variables are 
growing at constant rates. Defining  ˆ / ≡ kK A L ,  ˆ / ≡ cC A L , and  ˆ / ≡ yYA L  as variables that 
are constant in the steady state, the steady state conditions  ˆˆ /0 =  kk ,  ˆˆ /0 =  cc ,  /0 = YY uu , and 
/0 = AA uu  may be simplified to the following: 
    
11 * ˆ ˆ
ˆ
αα γ δ




,       ( 2 7 )  
    
11 * ˆαα α ρθ γ δ
−− = ++ YA K ku ,       ( 2 8 )  
    
** (1 ) ( 1 )
π υ
σ λφ γ λ γ
πυ
−= −+ + − + +−

SA n ,    (29) 
     ()
** (1 ) ( )
π µ
σ λφ β γ λ ψ γ
πµ
−= −+ + − +− +−

SA n .   (30) 
Combining these four equations and simplifying then yields the following solutions: 





S u ,       ( 3 1 )  






A u ,       ( 3 2 )  
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ck ,    (35) 
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α α −
= Y yk u.         ( 3 6 )  
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5.3 Comparative Statics 
 
    We now examine the impact of changes in various parameters of the model on the steady 
state allocation of labor to the production of final goods, the creation of innovations, and the 
accumulation of social capital. The top panels in Figure 1 show that a larger risk aversion 
parameter, θ, and a larger discount rate, ρ, are associated with a greater allocation of labor to 
the final goods sector, and correspondingly smaller allocations to the other sectors. This is 
because final goods production brings instant gratification through current consumption, while 
social capital accumulation and R&D activities only increase future consumption. 
    The middle left panel in Figure 1 shows that the social capital elasticity parameter in the   A 
equation has a negative relationship with the allocation of labor to final goods production, uY, a 
positive relationship with the allocation of labor to social capital accumulation, uS, and hump-
shaped relationship with the fraction of the labor force allocated to innovative activities, uA. 
The middle right panel in Figure 1 shows that the intertemporal spillover parameter in the  A   
equation has a negative relationship with uY, a hump-shaped relationship with uS, and a positive 
relationship with uA. 
    The bottom panels in Figure 1 show that a larger social capital spillover parameter (φ) or a 
larger physical capital “learning-by-doing” effect (λ) in the social capital accumulation 
equation results in a greater steady state allocation of labor to both innovation creation and 
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Fig. 1: The Impact of Parameter Values on Steady-State Resource Allocation   10
5.4 Transitional Dynamics 
 
To study the dynamic properties of the model away from its steady state, we need to reduce its 
dimensionality by assuming a constant physical capital investment rate, sK, as well as constant 
(and exogenously given) labor allocation shares, uA, uY and uS. The dynamics of the model may 
then be summed by the following equations describing the  ˆ 0 k =  , 0 A γ =   and  0 S γ =   schedules 
respectively: 












= ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠
,      ( 3 7 )  










,       ( 3 8 )  
     
(1 ) ( ) S
A




= .      ( 3 9 )  
These schedules are illustrated in the phase diagram in Figure 2. 
      Figure 2 also shows the impact of an increase in β, the elasticity parameter measuring the 
spillover effect of social capital on the rate of innovation, A  . The increase in β causes the 
steady state growth rates of technology and social capital, 
*
A γ  and 
*
S γ , to increase permanently. 
In addition, steady state capital per effective unit of labor, 
* ˆ / kK A L ≡ , decreases since 




ˆ 0 k = 
0 A γ = 
0 S γ = 
0 A γ =  ˆ k
 
  Figure 2: The Phase Diagram of the Model Showing the Impact of an Increase in β. 
 
5.5 Divergence between the Social Planner and Competitive Solutions 
 
We can quantify the divergence between the social planner’s solution and the decentralized, 
competitive solution and examine how the divergence varies with the different parameters in   11
the model. Recall that there are multiple sources of divergence in the model: (1) the spillover 
associated with the public goods aspect of social capital, captured by the parameter φ ; (2) the 
“learning-by-doing” effect in social capital creation; (3) the “standing on the shoulders of 
giants” effect in R&D, captured by the parameter ψ; (4) the “stepping on toes” effect in R&D, 
captured by η; and (5) the monopolistic power of intermediate goods producers, which varies 
with α. 
      Algebraically, the decentralized, competitive solution for the share of labor time allocated 







S DCD C u ,      ( 4 0 )  
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      To calibrate the model, we chose the following baseline values for the various parameters: 
 
Β  η  λ  φ   ψ  ρ  σ  θ n δS 
0.2 2/3 0.2 0.5 0.5  0.02  2/3 1.5  0.01  0.05 
 
The rate of time preference was set to 0.02, the risk-aversion parameter in the utility function 
chosen as 1.5, the rate of growth of the labor force as 0.01, and the depreciation rate of social 
capital at 0.05. 
 
Figure 3(a): The Impact of ψ and φ  on the Under-Allocation of  A u .   12
 
Figure 3(b): The Impact of ψ and η  on the Under-Allocation of  A u . 
 
` 
Figure 3(c): The Impact of η  and φ  on the Under-Allocation of  A u .   13
      Figures 3(a), 3(b), and 3(c) indicate that the under-allocation of labor time to social capital 
creation in the competitive solution compared to the planner’s solution is: increasing in ψ 
except when φ  is close to 1, is always increasing in φ , but decreasing in η except when ψ or φ  
are close to 0 (when the relationship becomes mildly hump-shaped). Note that Figure 3(a) is 
plotted with η = 2/3 and φ  = 0.5, Figure 3(b) is plotted with ψ = 0.5 and η = 2/3, while Figure 
3(c) is plotted with φ  = 0.5 and ψ = 0.5. One can demonstrate that the divergence between the 
competitive and planner’s solutions can be narrowed by an appropriate tax and subsidy 
scheme. 
 
5.6 Implications for the Design of Innovation Policies 
 
In recognition of the importance of social capital within innovation networks, government 
policies should focus on inducing firms to collaborate more intensively with other firms, 
research labs, universities and government agencies in order to increase the number, size and 
efficacy of networks. Foe example, there could conceivably be tax incentives for private 
expenditures on network-building activities. 
      Because of the public goods aspect of social capital creation, governments should lay the 
physical infrastructure that encourage networking such as building research and development 
hubs, industrial parks and clusters for high technology firms. The expenditures for such 
construction obviously need to be financed by taxes on other economic activities. Many 
governments in the more successful developing countries have firmly committed themselves 
towards the building of physical infrastructure that aid network social capital creation. 
Technology and science parks abound in China, Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Malaysia.
4  




In this paper, we formulated a macroeconomic growth model where social capital embedded in 
collaborative networks of firms (such as corporate partnerships and research consortia) 
increase the rate of technological and business innovations in high-tech industries. The model 
is a significant extension of the well-known Romer (1990) / Jones (1995) model of R&D and 
growth. We specify a dynamic equation governing the evolution of social capital and 
incorporate network social capital in the equation describing the evolution of technology. We 
derived the optimal quantity of resources that should be channelled away from pure production 
into activities that build network social capital, and solved for the steady state growth rate of 
the model economy. We then examined the comparative statics and transitional dynamics of 
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